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Competition Come Full Circle? Pending Legislation to Repeal the U.S. 
Railroad Exemptions 
 
Chris Sagers1 
 
he single oldest and probably most convoluted story in American antitrust is its 
relationship with the railroads. Railroads were among the first business entities in the 
United States to be perceived as social problems in and of themselves, regardless of 
any aid or preference gotten from government. The “populism” that had been a part of 
American politics since colonial times shifted from fear of government-supported aristocracy to 
fear of private economic power in its own right, and the railroads were among the first to 
embody that free-standing power. Perceived railroad abuses were chief motivations for the first 
state and federal antitrust statutes, and railroads were defendants in many of the earliest 
antitrust decisions. Even before there was a federal antitrust law, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”), the first federal regulator of an economic sector, was set up to constrain 
their power.  
 And yet the railroads were also among the early beneficiaries of a new kind of economic 
thinking that arose around the turn of the twentieth century, which led to near consensus that 
railroads and the other heavy infrastructure industries simply could not function on a 
competitive basis. And so was born a period of regulation under which government controlled 
entry, exit, and prices in the American transportation, communications, and energy industries. 
Because competition was displaced, those industries were also exempted from most antitrust 
scrutiny. Thus, not that long after their perceived wrongdoing precipitated the first antitrust 
legislation, the railroads managed to escape it more or less entirely by statutory exemption, and 
they have retained some degree of exemption ever since.2 
In all of these industries, though, the regime of rate-and-entry regulation has largely 
been dismantled, as a result of a complex series of deregulatory steps begun during the Carter 
administration and continuing ever since. In part this was the result of poor economic 
performance, and in the case of the railroads it was drastic. The 1970s saw a rash of railroad 
bankruptcies and the government takeover of the northeastern railroads that would become 
Conrail. Among the chief target of blame was the regulation of rates, entry, and exit. The 
                                                 
1 Chris Sagers is an Associate Professor of Law on the faculty of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland 
State University. 
2 On the history of the railroads, their relationship to antitrust, and their regulation, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., 
RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2001), SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM 
ANTITRUST LAW 8-13, 193-216 (2007), and RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE 
RAILROAD INDUSTRY:  A HISTORY OF REGULATORY POLICY (1991). On the history of traditional regulation in the 
infrastructure industries, see ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 333-42 (2007) 
[hereinafter “AMC REPORT”], Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998), and Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1197-1229 (1986). 
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railroads were partially deregulated by legislation in 1976 and 1980, the predominant effects of 
which were to deregulate entry and exit and to give railroads pricing freedom over most of 
their traffic.3 
Critically, though, deregulation in most industries left at least some antitrust protection 
in place. The railroads retain a complex bundle of protections that together add up to a fairly 
potent immunity, and by some accounts they have used it to anticompetitive ends. The 
immunities fall into basically four types:  
1. Railroad mergers are subject to review only by the ICC’s successor, the Surface 
Transportation Board (“STB”), and if approved cannot be challenged under 
Clayton Act § 7.4 The Board, according to its critics, has been too forgiving in its 
review, and for better or worse consolidation has been dramatic. Over the course 
of about forty years the ICC and STB oversaw and approved a series of mergers 
that reduced the number of Class I railroads5 from sixty-three to seven, a mere 
four of which now carry 90 percent of the nation’s rail traffic.6 Nowhere else in 
U.S. law may a regulatory agency approve a merger without DOJ or FTC 
approval,7 and the STB has approved mergers over strenuous agency objection.8  
2. While the railroads are no longer free to establish outright price-fixing cartels, 
they have a fairly broad immunity to enter into collaborative arrangements 
involving rate setting. The Secretary of Transportation may also convene 
conferences for the “unification or coordination of at least two rail carriers,” at 
which participants enjoy immunity for “any discussion . . . [or] agreements” 
reached there and approved by the Secretary.9  
                                                 
3 For discussion of railroad deregulation and the industry economic suffering that precipitated it, see GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFF., RAILROAD REGULATION:  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF THE STAGGERS ACT OF 1980, at (1990) 
[hereinafter “GAO Report”].. 
4 49 U.S.C. § 11321(a). Line sales are also subject only to STB review, and upon approval are immune from 
antitrust. 49 U.S.C. § 10901(c). 
5 The ICC and STB have classified railroads by size for purposes of the accounting system the agencies used for 
carrier financial reporting. In that classification system, “Class I” railroads are the largest and are currently defined as 
those having annual operating revenue of $250 million or more. See 49 C.F.R. Part 1201, subpart A, general 
instruction 1-1. 
6 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FREIGHT RAILROADS:  INDUSTRY HEALTH HAS IMPROVED, BUT CONCERNS ABOUT 
COMPETITION AND CAPACITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 19-21 (2006) [hereinafter “GAO REPORT 2006,”]. 
7 AMC REPORT, supra note 2, at 363-64. 
8 See, e.g., Antitrust Section, Dept. of Just., Press Release, Justice Department Has Antitrust Concerns About 
Union Pacific/Southern Pacific Railroad Merger, Apr. 12, 1996. The Board approved that particular merger, expressly 
rejecting DOJ’s views, see Union Pac. Corp.—Control and Merger—Southern Pac. Rail Corp., 1 S.T.B. 233, 73-75, 169 
(1996), and its decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Western Coal Traffic League v. STB, 169 F.3d 775 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). 
9 Railroad agreements relating to rates and other matters form what were traditionally known as “rate 
bureaus,” and subject to statutory limitations they are immune from antitrust upon STB approval. 49 U.S.C. § 10706. 
The Transportation Secretary’s authority is in 49 U.S.C. § 333. 
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3. Railroads subject to STB jurisdiction are largely immune from private antitrust 
litigation. As mentioned, STB-approved mergers and acquisitions cannot be 
challenged by any party under Clayton Act § 7, and private parties may not sue 
for any antitrust injunction under Clayton Act § 16.10 Private parties are also 
barred by the Keogh or “filed rate” doctrine from money damages where the 
gravamen concerns rates regulated by government.11  
4. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is removed entirely from oversight of 
the railroads. Section 5 of the FTC Act applies to railroads, but may be enforced 
against them only by the STB.12 
Thus, as the law stands, the railroads are subject to antitrust only as to: a) conduct that is 
not common carriage,13 b) horizontal conduct among themselves that is not part of an STB-
sanctioned collaboration or DOT-convened conference agreement, and c) dealings with third 
parties. 
The nub of essentially all current criticism of railroad behavior is the exploitation of 
captive shippers—those who have access to only one carrier. There is no doubt that such 
shippers have suffered. While rail rates generally fell for more than twenty years following 
deregulation, significant pockets of charges of 300 percent or more over costs have persisted, are 
now fairly widespread, and bear some correlation with captivity.14 While the STB’s underlying 
legislation requires that common carrier rates be “reasonable,” and provides a remedy where 
those charged by a “market dominan[t]” carrier are not,15 the complexity and expense of the 
process has rendered it useless to most shippers.16 Moreover, proponents of repeal legislation 
have complained about two specific practices in particular, “bottleneck” pricing and “paper 
barriers.”17 Theoretically, the STB is empowered to correct such abuses, but it has explicitly 
approved of bottleneck pricing18 and has granted easy approval of paper barrier agreements. 
                                                 
10 15 U.S.C. § 26 (providing that only United States may seek antitrust injunction against common carriers 
subject to STB jurisdiction). 
11 See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 
Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
13 That is to say, involving movements under private contract. The statutory exemptions apply only to conduct 
within the Board’s jurisdiction, which is over common carriage of persons or freight entirely by rail (or by rail and 
water if the waterborne assets are under the railroad’s control). 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5), (9) (defining “rail carrier” and 
“transportation”), § 10501(a) (setting out Board’s jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carrier”). 
14 GAO REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 30-36. 
15 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (requiring rate reasonableness); § 10707 (“market dominance” proceedings). 
16 See Anthony Johnstone, Captive Regulators, Captive Shippers:  The Legacy of McCarty Farms, 70 MONT. L. 
REV. 239, 258-59 (2009) (noting that because rate challenges can cost up to $5 million, few complaints are brought and 
virtually all of them fail). 
17 The former is practiced by railroads that own the final segment of trackage that reaches some group of captive 
shippers. Though the carrier might be able to exchange traffic from that bottleneck segment to other carriers for 
longer shipments, it can avoid that long-haul competition by simply refusing to exchange or refusing to quote prices 
other than for the entire long-haul. The latter arises when a large railroad spins off some terminal trackage, usually to 
fairly low-traffic destinations, to create a so-called “short line” railroad. In many cases the major carriers to have done 
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The empirical evidence on rail competition is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there 
is little doubt about the dramatic increase in concentration. Rates also began to rise in 2004, after 
an almost uninterrupted twenty-year decline,19 and some captive shippers pay inflated rates. 
The industry has also enjoyed gradually increasing profits, and critics attribute these profits to 
market power.  
On the other hand, there is consensus that concentration was needed to correct the 
severe problems of overcapacity and inefficient organization of the regulated era, and that 
during the period of consolidation costs have fallen and productivity has risen. There also is 
evidence that overcharges have resulted merely from periodic bouts of undercapacity, and that 
recently rising rates are at least partly explained by the oil crisis of the past few years.  
Still, concern over competitive abuses and a chorus of shipper complaints has driven a 
flurry of congressional investigations and other government study. In 2006 GAO found 
sufficient evidence of market power and competitive abuses to call on the STB for a 
comprehensive study. In reply, the Board commissioned a third-party study that rebutted most 
criticisms, arguing that railroad profits have been “normal” and that captivity has not been 
closely correlated with market dominance.20 
A handful of reforms have recently been proposed for rail transportation, and among 
them is repeal of the antitrust exemption.21 The currently pending Railroad Antitrust 
Enforcement Act of 200922 would make railroad mergers and acquisitions fully subject to § 7 
enforcement, would give the FTC enforcement authority for § 5 of the FTC Act, would permit 
private injunctive and monetary damages enforcement, and would repeal the Keogh and 
primary jurisdiction doctrines as to railroads. All along the motivating force appears to have 
been the Wisconsin congressional delegation. The bill’s chief sponsors have been Rep. Tammy 
Baldwin, a Democrat representing the Madison, Wisconsin area, and Senator Herb Kohl, both of 
whom introduced the same legislation in the prior Congress. This presumably reflects the 
                                                                                                                                                             
so have conditioned the transactions on the short lines’ adoption of contracts that impose prohibitive penalties on 
them if they exchange traffic with competing long-haul carriers. 
18 Central Power & Light Co. V. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 1 S.T.B. 1059 (1996). The Board’s decision was affirmed in 
MidAmerican Energy Co. v. STB, 169 F.3d 1099 (8th Cir. 1999). 
19 There is also some suspicion that rates have been understated in various ways. Railroads in recent years have 
begun shifting some functions to shippers, like loading and unloading, or the purchase and maintenance of 
equipment. They also began assessing fuel surcharges in 2003, in response to rising fuel costs, and shippers have 
complained. See GAO REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 16-18; OFF. OF ECON., ENV. ANALYSIS & ADMIN., SURF. TRANS. BD., 
STUDY OF RAILROAD RATES:  1985-2007, at 6 (2009) [hereinafter “STB RATE STUDY 2009”]. 
20 The evidence discussed here appears in GAO REPORT 2006, supra note 3, a Congressional Research Service 
study of coal transported by rail, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS:  RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF COAL TO 
POWER PLANTS:  RELIABILITY ISSUES (2007), STB RATE STUDY 2009, supra note 19, and in the STB-commissioned third-
party study, LAURITS R. CHRISTENSEN ASSOCS., INC., A STUDY OF COMPETITION IN THE U.S. FREIGHT RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
AND AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT ENHANCE COMPETITION (2008) (study commissioned by STB). 
21 Bills also have been proposed to reverse some STB decisions, such as its approval of bottlenecks and paper 
barriers, see, e.g., The Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act of 2007, S. 953, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2007), and on a broader level to re-frame the goals of national transportation policy, see, e.g., The Federal Surface 
Transportation Policy and Planning Act of 2009, S. 1036, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009). 
22 H.R. 233, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 7, 2009); S. 146, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 2009). 
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states’ agricultural economy and the fact that portions of Wisconsin are dependent on coal-fired 
electricity. Shippers of coal and grain have suffered unusual degrees of captivity and have little 
recourse to other transport modes; they complain of dramatic rail cost increases.23 
The pending bills did not progress particularly far during the first session. The House 
version was approved by the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, but 
awaits consideration by the full Judiciary Committee. The Senate companion was unanimously 
approved by committee, but has been stalled since early June, when key committee chairs 
agreed to incorporate it as part of a larger effort to reform the STB. In the prior Congress the bill 
was reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee in September of 2008,24 but advanced 
no further. 
The industry’s opposition to repeal is familiar both from its own opposition to prior 
deregulation and from the arguments of the other traditionally regulated industries. Its thrust is 
that the railroads suffered economically during the 1970s, a fact that by general consensus 
resulted from poor government regulation, but that in its current partially regulated state it has 
begun to prosper. The industry warns that pending repeal legislation would hamper it too 
severely and cause it to revert to the economic under-performance of the 1970s.25 
So would the railroads face major antitrust challenges following repeal of their 
exemptions? Superficially it might seem so. Shippers scattered throughout the country have 
access only to monopoly or duopoly lines and little meaningful intermodal competition. 
However, much of that concentration resulted from ICC- or STB-approved acquisitions, which 
themselves would plainly be exempt from antitrust challenge,26 and the mere unilateral pricing 
by monopolists and oligopolists is not ordinarily illegal merely because it exploits market 
power. Further consolidation would be open to § 7 challenge, but given the present level of 
concentration one wonders how much more there will be on any large scale.  
Some practices, however, including some that remain highly profitable to the railroads, 
seem in more jeopardy. Bottleneck pricing might plausibly be subject to refusal-to-deal or 
essential facilities liability under Sherman Act § 2, and paper barriers agreements could 
conceivably be challenged as illegal exclusive contracts. Other agreements currently employed 
                                                 
23 See STB RATE STUDY 2009, supra note 19, at 7. 
24 H.R. 1650, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 22, 2007); see H.R. REP. NO. 110-860 (Sep. 18, 2008). 
25 See J. Michael Hemmer, Written Testimony of the Association of American Railroads Before the House 
Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, House Committee on the Judiciary (May 19, 2009). 
26 The pending bills might raise a minor issue of statutory interpretation concerning retroactivity, and the 
railroads have stressed this argument in opposition, warning that scores of fully consummated transactions would be 
opened to challenge. See Hemmer, supra note 25. The argument seems very weak. All bills that have been proposed 
have contained the same explicit clause providing for prospective effect and a 180 day grace period following 
enactment for any conduct previously begun. Such legislative history as exists stresses this fact extensively. 
Admittedly, the pending bills would remove a proviso in current Clayton Act § 7, which provides that “[n]othing 
contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore legally acquired” and that it “shall [not] 
apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the . . Surface Transportation Board . . . .”  15 
U.S.C. § 18.  It seems plain, however, that the purpose of that repeal would be to expose future mergers and 
acquisitions, approved by the STB after enactment. to § 7 review. 
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could also be challenged, though their risks of liability seem smaller. Interline rate agreements, 
for example, are currently immune if approved by the STB.27 But since they involve the 
collaborative production of a service and not merely naked price fixing, they might legitimately 
be defended on ancillarity grounds,28 and might also receive a measure of statutory protection 
as joint ventures.29 
But a bigger and murkier question remains. Assuming some repeal legislation is passed, 
substantive antitrust would have to be harmonized with the economic regulatory rules that 
would still exist in federal railroad law. The courts’ chief guidance on that problem would be 
Trinko.30 There the Court refused to find a violation of § 2 on the part of an incumbent local 
telephone company that allegedly frustrated entry by would-be competitors, despite the fact 
that federal communications law required them to provide reasonable access to their 
proprietary infrastructure. The Court so ruled even though the underlying legislation contained 
a very explicit antitrust savings clause. The Court offered this general guidance: 
Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and 
circumstances of the industry at issue. . . . One factor of particular importance is 
the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy 
anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to 
competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will 
be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny. 
Where, by contrast, “[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which 
performs the antitrust function,” the benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes 
considerable disadvantages. Just as regulatory context may in other cases serve 
as a basis for implied immunity, it may also be a consideration in deciding 
whether to recognize an expansion of the contours of § 2.31 
There remains some question about just what effect Trinko will have,32 but if its thrust is 
that the presence of an economic regulatory regime counsels against aggressive antitrust, then 
enforcement against the railroads may be curtailed. The STB’s underlying legislation expressly 
mandates the Board’s concern for railroad “revenue adequacy,”33 and one way the railroads 
                                                 
27 49 U.S.C. § 10706. 
28 Under the doctrine of ancillary restraints, a restraint that otherwise would violate Sherman Act § 1 per se will 
be judged only under the rule of reason if it is merely ancillary and reasonably necessary to an otherwise pro-
competitive arrangement. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188-89 (1986); DEPT. OF JUSTICE & 
FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2 (2000). 
29 Under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06, participants in a joint 
venture can ordinarily ensure rule-of-reason treatment for their activities, exposure only to single damages, and an 
award of costs and fees in case of defense victory, by making disclosure of the venture to the Department of Justice. 
The Act requires that parties to the venture be U.S. persons. 
30 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
31 540 U.S. at 411-12 (internal citations omitted). 
32 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 2, at 340 (acknowledging disagreement over Trinko’s import, but urging 
that it is “best understood only as a limit on refusal-to-deal claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act; it does not 
displace the role of the antitrust laws in regulated industries.”). 
33 49 U.S.C. § 10101(3). See also 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(2) (requiring that even in the one area in which the Board 
can regulate rates, challenges to the “reasonableness” of rates of a market dominant carrier—i.e., a monopolist—the 
Board must “recogniz[e] the policy of this [statute] that carriers shall earn adequate revenues”). 
GCP: The Antitrust Chronicle                September 2009 (1)    
 
8 www.competitionpolicyinternational.com -- Competition Policy International, Inc.©  
Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author. 
 
 
have traditionally been permitted to achieve adequacy is through “differential pricing.” In other 
words, policy has always contemplated that carriers would exploit market power where they 
have it to subsidize operations in competitive markets, in order to cover total costs.  
The federal courts have long recognized a congressional mandate to balance shipper 
protection and competition, on the one hand, and against the carriers’ fiscal health, on the 
other.34 Also likely, the courts in their reconciliation of antitrust with railroad policy will be 
influenced by the availability of regulatory remedies specifically designed to address 
anticompetitive abuses—the STB rate relief power for captive shippers and the competitive 
access remedies. It seems unlikely to matter that these remedies have been singularly 
burdensome and difficult for shippers, because the courts have already recognized as much and 
have done nothing about it.35 
In short, there is no particular reason yet to believe railroad exemption repeal will occur 
in this Congress. The pending bills have not progressed far and have failed before, and they are 
opposed by the industry. But if they progress, and assuming there is not also some significant 
change to the overall railroad regulatory framework, it seems unlikely that antitrust litigation 
will be very successful or that it will much change the status quo in rail competition. 
                                                 
34 MidAmerican Energy Co. v. STB, 169 F.3d 1099, 1106 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Act protects both shippers and 
carriers. . . .  [A]n important part of achieving revenue adequacy is differential pricing.”); Midtec Paper Corp. v. 
United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Coal Exporters Ass’n v. United States, 745 F.2d 76, 80-81 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) 
35 See, e.g., Midamerican Energy, 169 F.3d at 1108. 
